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Abstract: Stratum, the de-facto mining communication
protocol used by blockchain based cryptocurrency sys-
tems, enables miners to reliably and efficiently fetch jobs
from mining pool servers. In this paper we exploit Stra-
tum’s lack of encryption to develop passive and active
attacks on Bitcoin’s mining protocol, with important
implications on the privacy, security and even safety of
mining equipment owners. We introduce StraTap and
ISP Log attacks, that infer miner earnings if given ac-
cess to miner communications, or even their logs. We
develop BiteCoin, an active attack that hijacks shares
submitted by miners, and their associated payouts. We
build BiteCoin on WireGhost, a tool we developed to hi-
jack and surreptitiously maintain Stratum connections.
Our attacks reveal that securing Stratum through per-
vasive encryption is not only undesirable (due to large
overheads), but also ineffective: an adversary can pre-
dict miner earnings even when given access to only
packet timestamps. Instead, we devise Bedrock, a min-
imalistic Stratum extension that protects the privacy
and security of mining participants. We introduce and
leverage the mining cookie concept, a secret that each
miner shares with the pool and includes in its puzzle
computations, and that prevents attackers from recon-
structing or hijacking the puzzles.
We have implemented our attacks and collected 138MB
of Stratum protocol traffic from mining equipment in
the US and Venezuela. We show that Bedrock is re-
silient to active attacks even when an adversary breaks
the crypto constructs it uses. Bedrock imposes a daily
overhead of 12.03s on a single pool server that handles
mining traffic from 16,000 miners.
Keywords: Bitcoin and Stratum mining protocols, pas-
sive and active attacks, traffic analysis, mining cookies
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1 Introduction
The privacy and security of Bitcoin have been exten-
sively studied [1–7] and documented [8]. While the focus
of previous work has been on the architectural vulnera-
bilities of the cryptocurrency, no work has been done to
analyze implementation vulnerabilities of the Stratum
mining protocol, the main Bitcoin mining option.
However, mining activities have important privacy
implications [9]. Learning the payouts of miners can
make them targets of hacking and coin theft [10, 11],
kidnapping [12], and, in countries where Bitcoin is ille-
gal [13, 14], expose them to arrest and equipment confis-
cation [15, 16]. For instance, in countries like Venezuela,
intelligence police hunt Bitcoin miners to extort, steal
mining equipment or prosecute [17].
In this paper we study the vulnerabilities of the
Stratum protocol [18], the de facto mining standard for
pooled Bitcoin mining [19] as well as alternative coins
mining, e.g., Litecoin [20], Ethereum [21] and Mon-
ero [22]; currently the altcoins with the most market
capitalization [23]. Stratum replaced the original get-
work protocol of Bitcoin mining [24], to enable miners
to fetch jobs from mining pool servers more reliably and
efficiently. In Stratum, the miners solve assigned jobs
and send their results back in the form of shares. The
mining pool server then compensates the miner accord-
ing to the difficulty of the assigned jobs and the number
of shares accepted.
We show that the lack of cryptographic protection
of communications has made the Stratum protocol vul-
nerable to several exploitation possibilities, see Figure 1.
An attacker able to observe the traffic between a miner
and a pool server can accurately infer the earnings of
the miner. We show that this result holds even if the at-
tacker has only limited access to the transmitted pack-
ets, e.g., metadata stored in ISP logs. In addition, we
show that active attackers, able to interfere with the
Stratum traffic of miners, may steal computational re-
sources and bring forth financial loss to their victims.
These attacks, especially given the wide adoption of
the Stratum protocol, show that Bitcoin and altcoin so-
lutions fail to ensure the monetary privacy and security
of the vital miner community. Furthermore, the attacks
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Fig. 1. Model of system that consists of a pool, miners, and ad-
versary. The pool and the miners communicate over the Stratum
protocol, to assign jobs and submit results (shares). The adver-
sary can eavesdrop, recover ISP logs, inject and modify the Stra-
tum communications of victim miners.
reveal that even an exhaustive use of encryption will
fail to ensure miner privacy, as access to only the times-
tamp of mining protocol traffic can enable an attacker
to predict the payouts of a victim miner. In addition, the
significant overhead of encryption makes such a solution
unappealing to pools, that need to handle mining traf-
fic from thousands of miners simultaneously, e.g., more
than 16,000 for the F2Pool pool [25–27]. In § 9.4 we show
that complete encryption of all Stratum traffic imposes
a daily overhead of 1.36 hours on a pool server handling
16,000 miners, while TLS imposes a daily overhead of
1.01 hours.
Furthermore, Tor does not address the above vul-
nerabilities. In fact, sending Stratum traffic over Tor
would enable an adversary to launch the ISP Log at-
tack not only from the same network with the victim,
but also from adversary controlled Tor exit nodes, that
can inspect the cleartext Stratum traffic to the desti-
nation. Also, Bitcoin over Tor has been shown to be
vulnerable to several attacks [28], and, even without an
adversary, Tor may introduce delays that can lead to
miners losing blocks.
Our Contributions. In this paper we introduce the
following contributions:
– Passive attacks. We show that F2Pool’s Stratum
implementation leaks sensitive miner information
not only through cleartext communications but also
indirectly, through hashrate dependent inter-packet
timing. We introduce StraTap and ISP Log, passive
attacks where adversaries accurately infer the earn-
ings of victim miners, given either captured trans-
missions of those miners, or only their log metadata.
– Active attack. We propose BiteCoin, a payout hi-
jack attack that enables an adversary able to access
the communications of a victim miner, to steal its
resources and mining payouts. To implement Bite-
Coin, we have developed WireGhost, a TCP hijack-
ing tool that surreptitiously modifies TCP packets,
without imposing disconnections or session resets.
– Bedrock. We develop Bedrock, a Stratum exten-
sion that addresses the proposed attacks. Bedrock
seeks to assuage the efficiency concerns of Bitcoin,
by imposing minimal modifications and encryption
overhead to the Stratum protocol. We introduce the
concept of mining cookies, secret values that min-
ers need to include in the computed puzzles. Mining
cookies prevent both passive and active attacks on
share submission packets, without encrypting the
vast majority of the pool communications.
– Results. We have collected 138MB of Stratum traf-
fic traces from mining equipment in the US and
Venezuela, and release it for public use [29]. We
have implemented the developed attacks and re-
port results from their deployment on AntMiner
mining equipment. We show that StraTap and IS-
PLog achieve low payout prediction errors, and that
BiteCoin can efficiently hijack job assignments and
share submissions from a victim miner. We show
that Bedrock prevents these attacks, and is resilient
to active attacks even when the adversary breaks its
crypto tools. Bedrock imposes a 12.03s daily over-
head on a single pool server that handles 16,000
miners simultaneously.
The attacks and defenses introduced in this paper apply
to the Stratum protocol, thus to most of the large min-
ing pools [30–34]. These attacks work even on miners
that are behind a NAT, or that are firewalled. Further-
more, while we focus our experiments on the popular
AntMiner mining equipment, our attacks are general
and apply to other manufacturers as well. We have no-
tified F2Pool about these vulnerabilities.
2 Model and Background
The Bitcoin mining ecosystem consists of miners and
pools, see Figure 1. The communication between pools
and miners takes place almost exclusively over the Stra-
tum, that we study in the next section. The main task
of Bitcoin miners (or mining nodes) is to permanently
insert new consistent data into the network. Miners col-
lect transaction data from other nodes, validate it and
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insert it in a structure called block. The miners need
to solve a cryptographic puzzle based on the block, be-
fore the block is permanently inserted into the storing
structure of the network, called the blockchain.
2.1 Mining Pools
As specialized, more powerful miners were designed,
and the difficulty of mining blocks increased, it became
increasingly difficult for individual, solo miners to suc-
cessfully mine and receive timely payouts for their work.
The concept of mining pools has emerged in order to ad-
dress this problem: enable miners to combine their re-
sources, then split the reward according to the amount
of work they have performed. Pools and miners form a
master/slave paradigm, where pools parallelize the min-
ing work among multiple miners. Thus, instead of ran-
domly receiving a large reward only once several years,
pooled miners receive smaller rewards, on a regular basis
(e.g., once per day).
Popular mining pools today interact with thou-
sands of miners. For instance, F2Pool has more than
16,000 miners [25–27]. As per the Bitcoin specification,
about 150 blocks are to be mined every day, i.e., 1 block
every 10 minutes. Since each block is, at the time of writ-
ing, worth 12.5 BTC , at an exchange rate of ≈ $1,100
per BTC, about 2 million dollars are distributed each
day. The larger mining pool servers control about 20%
of these earnings [35].
The mining pool rewards a share to the miner who
reports a proof of a unit of solved work. Pools often offer
a variable share difficulty feature: adaptively assign the
share target to miners, according to their computation
ability. Pools perform this in order to ensure that (i) the
assigned work is not too difficult, thus enable miners to
prove computation progress and gain regular payouts,
and that (ii) the work is not too easy, thus reduce the
overhead on the pool, to process shares submitted by
thousands of miners.
Hashrate to BTC conversion. The pool will reward
the miner according to the number of shares submitted
and accepted. Each pool has a different payout policy.
One of the most popular policies is “Pay Per Share”
(PPS) which usually has a pool fee attached to it. Since
the final calculation for share payment is dependent on
the actual mining activity of the pool, it is difficult to
provide an exact estimate of each share payout. How-
ever, most pools publish a hashrate to BTC (Bitcoin)
rate of conversion for miner verification purposes. At
Fig. 2. Coinbase transaction format. The fields in the table
are the underlying Bitcoin transaction fields. Stratum overlays
the coinbase fields (coinbase1, extranonce1, extranonce2,
coinbase2) on top of the Bitcoin coinbase fields. Bedrock (see
§ 6) introduces the mining cookie concept, whose value will over-
write the currently unused “previous hash” field within coinbase1.
the time of writing this paper, the conversion rate on
the F2Pool was 0.00246248 BTC per TH/s [30].
2.2 The Coinbase Transaction
As mentioned above, each block collects a set of previ-
ous transactions in the Bitcoin network. The first such
transaction is special, called the coinbase transaction
(see Figure 2): it specifies that the pool will receive
the value of this block (currently 12.5 Bitcoins) when
this block is mined. The Stratum coinbase consists of
4 fields, coinbase1, extranonce1, extranonce2, coinbase2,
overlayed on top of the Bitcoin coinbase information.
coinbase1 covers the first 5 fields of the input trans-
action (version, input count, previous transaction hash,
previous transaction index and input scriptlen) and part
of the script, in the original coinbase transaction specifi-
cation. Except for the version number, these parameters
are meaningless to all clients and pools since the coin-
base transaction does not have an input transaction.
The extranonce1 and extranonce2 fields are also
overlayed on the unused script. extranonce1 needs to
be unique (pseudo-random) per stratum connection.
extranonce2 is used in the mining puzzle and needs to
be incremented by the miner once the nonce parameter
is exhausted (see next paragraph). The rest of the coin-
base transaction is packed in the coinbase2 parameter.
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Fig. 3. Bitcoin block puzzle. The root of the Merkle tree built
over the coinbase and the mined transactions is the third field of
the block puzzle. The miner iterates over the nonce (last field)
and over the extranonce2 value, part of the coinbase transaction.
Bedrock, our secure Stratum extension, leverages
the unused “previous transaction hash” field (Figure 2),
to include the value of the mining cookie, see § 6.
2.3 The Bitcoin Puzzle
The goal of the mining process is to make it difficult for
a minority of malicious nodes to insert bogus data in-
side invalid blocks. It achieves this by transforming each
block (collection of transactions in the Bitcoin network)
into a cryptographic “puzzle”. The puzzle is designed
such that the probability of finding a solution by a min-
ing node is proportional to its computational power. A
Bitcoin puzzle consists of a target value and a tuple
F = (block version number || hash of previous block ||
RMT || timestamp || Nbits ), || denotes concatenation,
see Figure 3 for an illustration.
Specifically, F contains the block version number,
the hash of the previous block in the blockchain, the root
of a Merkle tree (RMT) described next, a timestamp,
and the final target value in the form of the number
of leading bits that need to be 0 for the block to be
considered “mined”. The Merkle tree is built over the
transactions that are being mined into the current block,
including the coinbase transaction, see Figure 3. Given
the F value, and the above mentioned target, the miner
iterates over the nonce and extranonce2 (see coinbase
transaction) values until it identifies a pair such that
H2(nonce||F ) < target (1)
where H2 denotes the double (SHA-256) hash. The
block is said to be “mined” when H2(nonce||F ) is less
than the target corresponding to the above Nbits value.
The target and the difficulty. While the Nbits value
specifies when the block is mined, pools set the above
target parameter to a larger value (fewer leading bits 0)
to enable miners to prove and be rewarded for progress.
The target of difficulty 1, denoted target_1, is defined
Fig. 4. Stratum protocol timeline over 24 hours captured between
an AntMiner S7 and the F2Pool pool. While we observe sev-
eral difficulty change packets (orange bars) throughout the day,
most are concentrated after the initial subscription protocol (tall
blue bar). The majority of share submissions are accepted (green
bars); only a few are rejected (red bars) or ignored (black bars).
by pools as the number 2224 − 1, i.e. a 256 bit number
with 32 bits of leading zeros followed by 224 bits of ones.
The difficulty value is a measure of how hard it is to
solve a puzzle for a given target value. Accordingly, the
relationship between the difficulty and target values is
given by the formula:
difficulty = target_1
target
= 2
224 − 1
target
(2)
2.4 Stratum
Stratum is a clear text communication protocol between
the pool and the miners [18], built over TCP/IP and us-
ing the JSON-RPC format. The official Stratum pro-
tocol documentation is not detailed and is often out-
dated [18]. In this section we describe the F2Pool [30]
implementation of the Stratum protocol, as observed
from Stratum packets we captured over 13 days be-
tween an AntMiner S7 device and the F2Pool mining
pool (see § 8.1). Figure 4 illustrates the timeline of cap-
tured Stratum protocol packets over a 24 hour interval.
The ability to capture, understand, modify and inject
these messages into a communication stream will be in-
strumental for the passive and active attacks described
in § 4 and § 5.
Miner subscription. To register with the pool, the
miner first subscribes through a connection subscrip-
tion message
mining.subscribe, params,
that describes the miner capabilities. The server re-
sponds with a subscription response message,
result, {methods}, extranonce1, extranonce2.size,
where the first field is a list method names used by
the server pool, the second field (see § 2.3), should be
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Fig. 5. Timeline of miner operating at 250MHz. We emphasize
the effect of successive share difficulty notification messages:
the miner’s share submission rate slows down. We also point the
multiple miner subscribe and authorization procedures (tall blue
bars) due to repeated miner disconnections.
random and unique per connection, but F2Pool sets to
constant “\x30\x30”, and the third is the size of the
extranonce2 (4B in F2Pool).
Miner authorization. Following the subscription ex-
change, Stratum authenticates the miner with the pool,
through a miner authorization request message
mining.authorize, account.minerID, password,
whose first field, the username, consists of two fields,
that enable a user to register multiple miners with the
same account. While the password field is transferred
in cleartext, it is currently ignored by pools. The pool
responds with a status result that notifies the miner
of the result of the authorization request. In Figure 4
and 5, the miner subscription and authorization mes-
sages are shown as a single blue bar (the tallest), seen
at the beginning of the interval and each time the miner
reconnects to the pool, e.g., after an Internet disconnec-
tion or power outage.
Share difficulty notification. Following a successful
authorization, the pool sends a difficulty notification
message to the miner
set.difficulty, difficulty,
that specifies the minimum share difficulty that the
server will be willing to accept. Figure 4 and 5 show the
difficulty notification messages as orange bars. They can
occur throughout the day as the pool seeks to adjust the
miner’s rate of share submissions.
Job assignment. The pool assigns jobs (puzzles) to
the miner through mining job notification messages
mining.notify, job_id, params, clean_jobs
that specify the puzzle parameters, i.e., the fields of the
F value in Equation 1 (see § 2.3), and a boolean that
indicates if the miner should drop all previous jobs and
work exclusively on the one specified by this message.
Share submission. Once the miner finds a solution
that satisfies Equation 1, it sends a share submission
message to the pool for verification and credit:
mining.submit, account.minerID, job_id, time,
nonce, extranonce2
that specifies the miner’s username, the job id received
in the previous mining job notification, and the param-
eters of the puzzle solution: the nonce and extranonce2
parameters, see § 2.3. The pool uses these values to re-
construct the F value (see § 2.3), and verifies that Equa-
tion 1 is satisfied.
The pool responds with a status result message, il-
lustrated in Figure 4: green bars denote accepted shares,
red bars denote rejected shares, and black bars denote
ignored shares. Shares can be rejected due to stale work,
i.e., being submitted too late. The miner continues to
mine current jobs until it receives a job message from
the pool that requires it to invalidate previous jobs (see
the “clean jobs” flag in the job assignment message).
3 Adversary Model
We consider adversaries that can launch both passive
and active attacks against the Bitcoin network, see Fig-
ure 1. We assume that the pool and the miner are
honest. However, adversaries can target the communi-
cations of specific, victim miners. Adversaries can own
mining equipment, can eavesdrop and interfere with ex-
isting communications, and may even obtain data from
ISPs. We now detail each of these adversarial capabili-
ties.
Eavesdropping capabilities. We consider first an ad-
versary who can access the entire communication of a
victim miner. Such adversaries include over-controlling
governments, or attackers who gain control to equip-
ment on the same LAN as the victim. We assume that
such an adversary can capture and inspect all the pack-
ets sent and received by the victim miner.
ISP log capabilities. We also consider adversaries
with access to ISP logs, that include entries for the com-
munications of the miners in the ISP’s subnet and the
pool. This capability is more restrictive than the eaves-
dropping capability, in terms of the data that can be
extracted from the miner-to-pool communications. This
is because ISP logs usually contain only metadata [36],
in order to comply with law enforcement requests [37].
However, these capabilities may enable the adversary
to target more victims (i.e., all the miners whose traffic
was logged).
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Potential perpetrators include insiders (e.g., ISP
employees) and government organizations that can sub-
poena the logs. While law enforcement insiders have
been shown to abuse collected data [38], agencies have
also been hacked in the past. Stolen data may then be
sold, auctioned, or even made public, thus becoming ac-
cessible to a broader range of adversaries.
We assume that this adversary has access to packet
metadata that includes timestamps, source and destina-
tion IPs and ports, and connection flags. As we show in
§ 4.2, these values enable the attacker to identify mining
traffic via well known pool IP/port pairs, and identify
the start of mining sessions.
Active attack capabilities. We further consider an
adversary that can modify the communication stream
between the server pool and a mining client. Potential
such adversaries include attackers that are on the same
network as the victim miner, rogue employees at an in-
termediate ISP, or a government backed agency. In § 5,
we show that such an adversary can add jobs and re-
place submitted shares. While this may allow for trivial
denial of service attacks as well, in this paper we do
not consider DoS attacks. We note that DoS techniques
exist with lesser technical requirements [39, 40].
3.1 Relevance of Attacks
In the following section we introduce passive and active
attacks against miners that use the Stratum protocol,
whose goal ranges from inferring to stealing the payouts
of the victim miners. Inferring the payouts of miners ex-
poses their owners to a suite of attacks. Adversaries can
hack the computers or accounts of miner owners in order
to steal their payouts [10, 11]. Passive attacks can also
enable the adversary to identify miners worthy of being
targeted with resource hijacking attacks, e.g., Bitecoin,
see § 5. In addition, this knowledge enables adversaries
to target miner owners for equipment theft, arson [41],
kidnapping [12], and, in countries where Bitcoin is ille-
gal [13, 14], for extortion and prosecution [17].
4 Passive Attacks
In this section we show that an attacker that observes
even partial traffic of a victim miner, can infer the pay-
outs received by the miner. We introduce two passive
attacks, that make different assumptions on the adver-
sary’s capabilities. First, the StraTap attack assumes
an adversary able to capture and inspect entire packets
transmitted between a pool and a victim miner. Sec-
ond, the “ISP Log” attack assumes an adversary that is
able to inspect only packet metadata, i.e., IP addresses,
port numbers, and connection flags. In the following we
detail each attack.
4.1 The StraTap Attack
We consider first an eavesdropping adversary, see § 3.
Given access to all the packets sent and received by the
victim miner, the attacker counts the share submission
messages along with their associated difficulty (as de-
scribed in § 2.4). The attacker uses this data to estimate
the hashrate of the victim miner.
Specifically, the probability of randomly finding a
hash with the appropriate difficulty is given by the ra-
tio between the target (i.e. the number of hashes with
the appropriate number of leading zeros according to the
assigned job), and the total number of possible hashes.
Hence, the probability of a miner finding a share with
a single hash is p = target2256−1 . The expected number of
hashes, E, that the miner needs to calculate before find-
ing a valid share is then 1/p. Then, we derive the fol-
lowing for E:
E = 2
256 − 1
target_1 ×
target_1
target
=
= 2
256 − 1
2224 − 1 × difficulty ≈ difficulty × 2
32
(3)
The second equality follows from Equation 2, and the
fact that the target of difficulty 1, target_1 is 2224 − 1,
see § 2.3. If we divide Equation 3 by the hashrate of the
miner, we obtain a formula that allows us to compute
the expected time to find a share at a given difficulty:
time = E
hashrate
= difficulty × 2
32
hashrate
(4)
Thus, hashrate = difficulty × 232time . The attacker ob-
tains the difficulty value by inspecting the share diffi-
culty notification messages (see § 2.4). In addition, the
attacker estimates the time value as the ratio of the
length of time between consecutive share difficulty no-
tification messages (orange bars in Figure 4) and the
number of shares submitted and accepted during that
interval:
time = total time between difficulty changesnumber of submitted (and approved) shares
The attacker obtains the accepted share count by in-
specting the share submission messages and their corre-
sponding status results, see § 2.4.
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Miner MITM Pool Server
SEQ:x, LEN:y
SEQ:x, LEN: y + z
ACK: x + y + z
ACK: x+ y + z - z
SEQ:x+y
SEQ:x+y+z
Fig. 6. WireGhost illustration: TCP hijacking with active re-
synchronization, when the man-in-the-middle (MITM) adversary
adds z bytes to an existing packet originating from the client.
WireGhost modifies the sequence numbers, to hide the difference
in packet sizes.
Given the inferred hashrate of the miner, the at-
tacker uses the hashrate to payout conversion (see the
corresponding paragraph in § 2.4) to predict the amount
of Bitcoins received by the victim. In § 9.1 we ex-
perimentally evaluate the accuracy prediction of the
StraTap attack.
4.2 The ISP Log Attack
We now consider an attacker with ISP log data capabil-
ities, see § 3. The ISP Log attack proceeds as follows.
First, the attacker identifies the beginning of the con-
nection between the victim miner and the pool. This is
the time when a 3-way handshake connection is estab-
lished, whose first step is a “connection subscription”
message as described in § 2.4. Then, the attacker pre-
dicts the hashrate of the miner based on statistics over
the inter-packet times logged for the miner.
In early experiments we have observed that predic-
tors that use statistics over long time intervals are in-
accurate. To address this problem, we have identified
and exploited a vulnerability of the Stratum protocol.
Specifically, we observed that the first share difficulty
notification message (see § 2.4) following a successful
miner subscription, sets the difficulty to the minimum
value acceptable by the pool (e.g., 1024 for F2Pool). In
addition, in § 9.2 we show that the pool sends its sec-
ond share difficulty notification after approximately 50
share submission messages (for difficulty 1024) received
from the miner.
Then, the attacker estimates the time taken by
share submissions for jobs of difficulty 1024, i.e., over
the first 50 packets sent by the miner following its sub-
scription and authorization process. It then uses the
process outlined in the above StraTap attack to pre-
dict the miner’s hashrate and payout. The attacker can
repeat this process when observing subsequent 3-way
handshake connection protocols of the victim miner,
e.g., when a disconnection occurs, in order to improve
its estimates of the miner hashrate. In § 9.2 we show
that even when the ISP Log attack performs a single
hashrate inference attack per day, its daily miner payout
prediction achieves a mean percentage error of -9.49%.
5 The BiteCoin Attack
We consider now an active attacker with the ability to
capture and modify the communication stream between
the pool and the victim miner, see § 3. In the following,
we first focus on the challenge to hijack and maintain
the TCP connection between the miner and the pool,
then introduce BiteCoin, an attack that hijacks pay-
ments from victim miners.
5.1 WireGhost: TCP Hijack with Re-Sync
Existing tools. Traditional TCP hijacking attack tools
seldom consider the need to preserve the status of the
communication parties. For instance, in tools like Shi-
jack [42] and Juggernaut [43], once the TCP sequence
mangling is performed, the generated ack storm is elim-
inated by resetting the connection with one of the peers.
The tool Hunt [44] does have a re-synchronization func-
tionality but it is limited to the Telnet protocol and re-
quires victim interaction in the form of a social engineer-
ing attack to be successful. Stratum active attacks re-
quire that the original mining connection is maintained
and that the re-synchronization needs to be done com-
pletely unattended. For instance, the extranonce1 pa-
rameter will be different for each connection, thus the
attacker should not force disconnections.
WireGhost. We have developed WireGhost, a TCP
hijack tool that maintains the status of the hijacked
connection, without having to reset the communication
streams. To address ack storms that would occur due
to communication changes (e.g., packet modification,
injection, removal), WireGhost modifies the TCP se-
quence of packets according to the payload modifica-
tion performed by the attacker, see Figure 6. Specifi-
cally, if the attacker inserts data into the TCP payload
(including injecting new packets), WireGhost subtracts
the appropriate number of bytes from the pool server’s
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Fig. 7. BiteCoin attack illustration. The attacker, a subscribed
miner, forwards job assignments received from the pool to the
victim miner. It then hijacks the victim’s share submissions and
sends them as its own to the pool, to get the credit.
ack sequence for all the packets that follow the modi-
fied (or inserted) one. It then adds the same amount of
bytes to the sequence number for all the following pack-
ets originating from the client. WireGhost performs the
opposite mathematical operations when the attacker re-
moves data from the TCP payload.
5.2 BiteCoin
We have used WireGhost to develop BiteCoin, an at-
tack tool that enables an active adversary to steal CPU
cycles and payouts from victim miners. We consider an
attacker who subscribes a device under his control as a
miner to the pool, see Figure 7 for an illustration.
Given access to the communication medium be-
tween the victim miner and the pool, BiteCoin first de-
tects the miner subscription protocol (the 3-way hand-
shake). It then uses WireGhost to hijack the TCP con-
nection between the miner and the pool. Then, when
the attacker device receives a job assignment message
from the pool, it directly injects it into the TCP con-
nection of the victim miner and the pool. The victim
miner receives this job assignment packet as if it was
coming from the pool.
Once the victim miner computes a share for this
job, it packs it into a share submission message and
sends it over its TCP connection to the pool. BiteCoin
intercepts this share submission packet of the victim,
and modifies it by changing the victim’s username to
its own. It then sends this modified share submission
over its own TCP connection to the pool. BiteCoin also
sends to the pool a mangled copy of the victim’s original
share submission, to ensure that it is rejected. In § 8.2
we detail our BiteCoin implementation, and in § 9.3 we
present results over its deployment.
6 Bedrock: Secure Stratum
We now study defenses against the proposed attacks. We
first describe the requirements of a private and secure
mining protocol, then introduce Bedrock, a Stratum ex-
tension, and discuss its defenses.
6.1 Solution Requirements
A private and secure Stratum protocol should satisfy
the following informal requirements:
– Security. The solution needs to protect both
against the Stratum attacks that we introduced in
§ 4 and § 5, and against attacks that target the so-
lution itself.
– Efficiency. Encryption of all the Stratum mes-
sages is not only inefficient, but also insecure: in
§ 9.2 we show that the ISP Log attack can predict
the miner’s profits while knowing only the miner’s
transmission timestamps.
– Adoptability. The solution should introduce mini-
mal modifications to the Stratum protocol, in order
to simplify its adoptability by pools and miners.
6.2 The Solution
We introduce Bedrock 1, a secure and efficient exten-
sion of the Stratum protocol. Bedrock seeks to prevent
adversaries from inferring the hashrates of miners, and
to efficiently authenticate Stratum messages.
Bedrock has 3 components, each addressing differ-
ent Stratum vulnerabilities. The first component au-
thenticates and obfuscates the job assignment and share
submission messages. The second component secures
the share difficulty notifications, and the third compo-
nent secures the pool’s inference of the miner’s capa-
bilities. In the following we detail each component. We
assume that the pool shares a unique secret symmetric
key KM with each miner M . The miner and the pool
create the key during the first authorization protocol
(see § 2.4), e.g., using authenticated Diffie-Hellman).
6.2.1 Mining Cookies
The share submission packets are particularly vulnera-
ble. First, they can reveal the target value, thus the diffi-
culty of the jobs on which the miner works and then the
1 In geology, the bedrock is a hard stratum.
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Algorithm 1 Bedrock pseudo-code for cookie gener-
ation and job verification (pool side), and job solving
(miner side).
1.Implementation PoolServer
2. generateCookie(Miner M){
3. RM := getRandom(256);
4. CM := H2(RM ,M.uname);
5. KM := M.key;
6. store(M.uname, KM , RM , target);
7. sendEncrypted(M , EKM (RM ));
8. verifyJob(Miner M , nonce, extranonce2){
9. (KM , RM , target) := getMParams(M.uname);
10. CM := H2(RM ,M.uname);
11. F := computeF(CM , extranonce2);
12. if (H2(nonce||F ) < target)
13. sendToMiner(M , result, “accept”);
14. else sendToMiner(M , result, “reject”);
15.Implementation Miner
16. KM : int[256] % key shared with pool
17. CM : int[256] % mining cookie;
18. solvePuzzle(target: int){
19. do
20. randPerm := newPseudoRandPerm(32);
21. extranonce2 := getRandom(32);
22. F := computeF(CM , extranonce2);
23. while (randPerm.isNext()){
24. nonce := randPerm.next();
25. if (H2(nonce||F ) < target)
26. sendToPool(uname, nonce, extranonce2);
27. while (clean_jobs != 1)
miner’s hashrate (see § 7.1). Second, share submissions
can be hijacked by an active adversary, see § 5. Encryp-
tion of share submissions will prevent these attacks, but
it will strain the pool’s resources.
To efficiently address these vulnerabilities, we intro-
duce the concept of mining cookie, a secret that each
miner shares with the pool, see Figure 8 and Algo-
rithm 1. The miner uses its mining cookie as an addi-
tional, secret field in the Bitcoin puzzle. Without knowl-
edge of the mining cookie, an adversary cannot infer the
progress made by the miner, thus its hashrate and pay-
out, thus cannot hijack shares submitted by the miner.
Specifically, let RM be a random cookie seed that
the pool generates for a miner M Algorithm 1, line
3). The pool associates RM with M , and stores it
along with M ’s symmetric key KM , and its current
target value (line 6). The pool computes M ’s cookie as
CM = H2(RM ,M.uname) (line 4), where M.uname is
the username of the miner. It then sends RM to M , en-
crypted with the key KM (line 7), see § 6.2.2. The miner
similarly uses RM and its usernameM to compute CM .
To minimally modify Bitcoin, Bedrock stores the
cookie as part of the coinbase transaction (see Figure 2),
in the place of its unused previous hash field. This field
is unused since the coinbase transaction does not have
a need for a meaningful input address hash (see § 2.2).
Fig. 8. Bedrock puzzle illustration. The cookie CM is generated
on the pool, while the nonce and extranonce2 are generated
on the miner. The coinbase transaction contains both CM and
extranonce2, see Figure 2.
Thus, the puzzle remains the same: The miner iterates
over the nonce and extranonce2 values, and reports the
pairs that solve the puzzle, along with its username, in
share submission packets (lines 23-26).
To verify the shares, the pool retrieves the miner’s
key KM , random seed RM and target values (line 9).
It uses RM to reconstruct the cookie (line 10) and uses
target, and the reported nonce and extranonce2 values,
to reconstruct and verify the puzzle lines 11 ans 12).
Random iterators. In the Bitcoin protocol and the
Stratum implementation on F2Pool, the nonce and
extranonce2 values are incremented sequentially: once
the miner exhausts nonce, it increments extranonce2,
then continues to iterate over a reset nonce value. In
§ 7.1 we show that this further exposes the miner to
hashrate inference attacks. We address this problem by
requiring the miner to choose random values for nonce
and extranonce2 at each puzzle iteration. To prevent the
miner from recomputing an expensive Merkle tree root
at each iteration, we iterate through the nonce space
using a pseudo random permutation (lines 20, 24).
Cookie refresh. When a miner mines the current
block, i.e., when H2(nonce||F ||CM ) is less than the tar-
get corresponding to the Nbits value, see § 2.3, the puz-
zle solution needs to be published in the blockchain. The
published block needs to include all the fields that de-
fined the puzzle (see § 2.3), including the miner’s cookie,
to be publicly verified.
To prevent an adversary who monitors the
blockchain to learn the mining cookie of a victim miner
and then launch a successful BiteCoin attack (see § 7.1),
Bedrock changes the mining cookie of the miner once the
miner mines the current block. This is an infrequent
event: for an AntMiner S7 mining equipment, with a
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hashrate of 4.73 TH/s, and the current Bitcoin network
difficulty (2.58522748405e+11), Equation 4 shows that
the expected time to mine a block is 7.44 years. This
is a very low lower bound since it assumes a constant
difficulty. In reality, the difficulty has increased expo-
nentially since the creation of Bitcoin. To change the
cookie, the pool invokes generateCookie (line 2).
6.2.2 Protect Communicated Secrets
Stratum’s share difficulty notification messages reveal
the difficulty assigned by the pool to the miner and
that the miner uses in the subsequent jobs. Knowledge
of the puzzle difficulty value coupled with the (regu-
lated) share submission rate, will enable the adversary
to infer the hashrate of the miner (see Equation 3), thus
its payout. In addition, Bedrock also needs to commu-
nicate secret values (e.g., the random RM , see § 6.2.1).
Bedrock addresses these problems by extending Stra-
tum’s set difficulty notifications to the followingmining
encrypted message:
mining.encrypted, EKM(param_list)
where (param_list) is a list of values that need
protection, i.e., difficulty values and the se-
cret RM . Specifically, param_list can contain
any number of sensitive values in the format
[[“difficulty”,1024],[“secret”,RM]].
6.2.3 Secure Hashrate Computation
The hashrate inference protocol following a miner sub-
scription and authorization, as documented in § 4.2 and
§ 9.2 can be exploited also by an adversary to infer the
miner’s hashrate. To address this vulnerability, Bedrock
requires the miner to directly report its hashrate dur-
ing the initial subscription message, along with other
miner capabilities. The miner can locally estimate its
hashrate, e.g., by creating and executing random jobs
with a difficulty of 1024. The miner also needs to factor
in its communication latency to the pool, which it can
infer during the subscription protocol. The miner sends
its hashrate encrypted, using the “mining encrypted”
message defined above.
If subsequently, the pool receives share submissions
from the miner, outside the desired rate range, it can
then adjust the difficulty (through the above encrypted
share difficulty notifications) in order to reflect its more
accurate inference of the miner’s hashrate.
7 Discussion
7.1 Security Discussion
We now discuss attacks against Stratum and Bedrock,
and detail the defenses provided by Bedrock.
Target reconstruction attack. An attacker that
can inspect cleartext subscription response, job assign-
ment and share submission packets, can reconstruct the
job (i.e., puzzle) solved by the victim miner: Recover
extranonce1 from an early miner subscription message,
coinbase1, coinbase2 and the Merkle tree branches from
a job assignment, and nonce and extranonce2 from a
subsequent share submission packet. The attacker then
reconstructs the F field of the puzzle (see § 2.3) and
uses it to infer the miner’s hashrate, even without know-
ing the puzzle’s associated target value. Specifically, the
attacker computes the double hash of F concatenated
with nonce, then counts the number of leading zeroes
to obtain an upper bound on the job’s target. The at-
tacker then uses recorded inter-share submission time
stats and Equation 3 to estimate the miner hashrate.
Bedrock thwarts this attack through its use of the
cookie CM , a secret known only by the miner and the
pool. The cookie is part of the puzzle. Without its
knowledge, the attacker cannot reconstruct the entire
puzzle, thus infer the target.
Brute force the cookie. The attacker can try to brute
force the cookie value. To gain confidence, the attacker
uses the fields from multiple jobs assigned to the same
miner to try each candidate cookie value. A candidate
is considered “successful” if it produces a high target
value for all the considered jobs. However, in § 8 we
leverage the unused, 256-bit long “previous hash” field
of the coinbase transaction, to store the mining cookie.
Brute forcing this field is consider unfeasible.
Resilience to cryptographic failure. We assume
now an adversary that is able to break the encryption
employed by the pool and the miner, e.g., due to the use
of weak random values. Giechaskiel et al. [45] studied
the effect of broken cryptographic primitives on Bitcoin,
see § 10. While such an adversary can compromise the
privacy of the miner, by recovering the miner’s cookie,
he will be prevented from launching active attacks. This
is because the miner’s cookie is a function of both a ran-
dom number and the miner’s username.
Specifically, if the attacker hijacks a miner’s share
submission, the pool would use the attacker’s user-
name instead of the victim’s username to construct
the cookie, the coinbase transaction and eventually the
header block. The share will only validate if the attacker
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managed to find a username that produced a double
hash that was still smaller than the target corresponding
to the difficulty set by the pool. However, the attacker
will need to find such usernames for each hijacked share.
If the attacker was able to quickly find such partial col-
lisions, it would be much easier to simply compute the
shares without doing any interception and hijacking.
We further consider an attacker able to break the
hash function (invert and find collisions). Such an at-
tacker can recover a miner’s RM value, then find a user-
name that produces a collision with the miner’s cookie
CM . We observe however that such an attacker could
then be able to also mine blocks quickly, e.g., by invert-
ing hash values that are smaller than the target corre-
sponding to the Nbits value.
7.2 Limitations
Opportunistic cookie discovery. When the miner
mines the current block, i.e., the double hash of the puz-
zle is smaller than the target corresponding to Nbits,
the miner’s cookie is published in the blockchain. An
adversary who has captured job assignments and share
submissions from the miner, just before this takes place,
can use them, along with the published cookie, to recon-
struct the entire puzzle and infer the miner’s hashrate.
This opportunistic attack may take years (e.g., 7.44
years for an AntMiner S7, see § 6.2.1), while, from our
experience, mining equipment has a useful lifetime of
around 2 years. However, this attack may be more ef-
fective against an entity that owns many homogeneous
miners: an adversary may only need days to infer the
rate of a single miner.
However, to address this limitation, each miner
could, at random intervals, change its operation fre-
quency to a randomly chosen value within an “accept-
able” operation range. Assuming that the adversary
only captures a limited window of the victim miner’s
communications, he will only be able to (i) recover tem-
porary, past hashrate values of the miner, and (ii) recon-
struct the miner’s payouts over the monitored interval.
Since the miner changes its operation frequency, once a
new cookie is assigned, the adversary will not be able
to predict the miner’s future hashrates and payouts.
Verification scope. We have only investigated the im-
plementation of Stratum in the pool F2Pool. However,
the identified privacy issues also likely affect other pools,
as any obfuscation to the set difficulty messages would
break the compatibility with the Stratum protocol im-
plemented in current mining equipment.
8 Implementation and Testbed
In our experiments, we have used AntMiner S7, a spe-
cialized FPGA device for Bitcoin mining that achieves
a hashrate of 4.73 TH/s at 700MHz [46]. We have con-
figured the device for mining on the F2Pool pool, using
the Stratum protocol [30].
8.1 Passive Attacks
In order to collect experimental traffic for the passive
attacks, we have leveraged the ability of the AntMiner
S7 device to operate at different chip clock frequen-
cies in order to simulate miner devices with different
capabilities. Specifically, we carried out 24 hour long
mining experiments with the AntMiner S7 operating
at frequencies ranging from 100 MHz to 700MHz, with
50MHz granularity. We have used Tcpdump [47] to cap-
ture 138MB of Stratum traffic of AntMiner S7 devices in
the US (May 27 - June 8, 2016) and Venezuela (March 8
- April 2, 2016). We have sliced the resulting pcap files
into 24 hour intervals using editcap, then processed the
results using python scripts with the scapy library [48].
In addition to the mining traffic, for each of the 24
hour runs, we collected the empirical payout as reported
by the pool, as well as the device hashrate reported by
its internal functionality. We used 24 hour runs because
the pool uses 24 hour cycles for executing payouts. We
have manually synchronized the runs and payout cycles
so as to easily correlate the data collected with its cor-
responding payout.
StraTap attack. To implement the StraTap attack, we
have created a script that selects packets from the cap-
tured traces with the “set_difficulty” pattern (invoked
method of the share difficulty notification messages).
This pattern signals our script to perform a share sub-
mission count reset, as well as a new recording of the
new difficulty.
ISP Log attack. For the ISP Log attack, we used
packets sent after the 3-way handshake initiated by
the pool. In addition, to compute more accurate inter-
packet times, we only considered packets that had the
PUSH flag set (captured by most firewall logs, e.g.,
Snort IDS), thus with non-empty payloads (i.e., no ack
packets that originated on the miner). The PUSH flag is
used to mitigate the effects of delays on the processing of
share submissions, that may end up causing share rejec-
tions. By setting the PUSH flag, miners try to increase
the chance that their shares are quickly processed.
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Fig. 9. Architecture of BiteCoin attack implementation.
8.2 BiteCoin Attack Implementation
The BiteCoin attack system is illustrated in Figure 9.
We have built WireGhost using the iptables nfqueue
target, in order to pass packets into user space. Once
it receives network segments in the user space, it uses
the scapy python library to parse and modify packets.
Additionally, it uses the the python nfqueue bindings in
order to pass a verdict to the packets.
In order to test BiteCoin and WireGhost, we set up
the victim miner behind an attacker controlled server
that performed “source NAT” and packet forwarding
for it. This architecture allowed us to emulate an active
attacker intercepting the communication between the
miner and the pool. We have implemented the attacker
as a python script that connects to the F2Pool using
Stratum, then intercepts and modifies job assignments
and share submissions on the victim’s connection to the
pool. While the attacker script does not perform any
mining, in § 9.3 we show that it is able to steal the
victim’s hashing power.
8.3 Bedrock Implementation
One requirement of Bedrock is to minimally disrupt the
Stratum protocol, see § 6.1. Thus, instead of designing
the cookie to be an external field, we seek to leverage
unused fields of the coinbase transaction. An obvious
candidate for the cookie placement is the input script
where the extranonce1 and extranonce2 reside. How-
ever, most pools have already started using this space
for their own internal procedures, e.g., in F2Pool, to
store the miner’s name.
Instead, Bedrock uses the yet unused, 32 byte (256
bit) long “previous input address” field of the coinbase
transaction, see Figure 2. Since the coinbase transac-
tion rewards the pool with the value of the mined block
(if that event occurs), its input is not used. We have in-
Freq(MHz) Hashrate(GHz) StraTap Hashrate(GHz)
700 4720.55 4571.48
650 4371.85 4309.96
600 4040.49 4151.27
550 3693.90 3624.13
500 3365.38 3524.57
450 3030.01 3154.80
400 2689.34 2696.72
350 2364.61 2382.17
300 2023.65 2039.55
250 1687.17 1699.91
200 1347.14 1274.29
150 1010.19 1007.06
100 672.55 703.28
Table 1. Operation frequency, actual hashrate and StraTap in-
ferred hashrate. We observe the correlation between the actual
and the average hashrate, that allowed StraTap to achieve a good
payout estimate.
vestigated the Stratum implementation of several pools,
including F2Pool [30], GHash.io [32], SlushPool [33] and
have confirmed that none of them use this field. In ad-
dition, we note that the size of this field makes it ideal
to store the output of a double SHA-256 hash.
9 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the StraTap, ISP Log and
BiteCoin attacks, as well as the performance of Bedrock.
We use the mean squared error (MSE) and the mean
percentage error (MPE) to evaluate the accuracy of the
predictions made by the passive attacks. Specifically,
let P = {P1, .., Pn} be a set of observed daily pay-
ments over n days, and let P¯ = {P¯1, .., P¯n} be the cor-
responding predicted daily payments for the same days.
Then, MSE(P¯ , P ) = 1n
∑n
i (P¯i − Pi)2, and MPE(P¯ , P )
= 100%n
∑n
i
Pi−P¯i
Pi
.
9.1 The StraTap Attack
We have used the StraTap script described in § 8.1 to
calculate the average time of share creation for each of
the detected intervals of constant difficulty. For each of
the 24 hour runs, we also calculated the weighted aver-
age difficulty as well as the weighted average hashrate
for the entire run. In addition, we have also used Equa-
tion 3, along with the computed average time and
recorded difficulty values, to compute a prediction of
the weighted average hashrate of the miner.
Table 1 shows the AntMiner’s frequency of opera-
tion, the output hashrate achieved at that frequency,
and the predicted hashrate. As expected, there is a lin-
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Fig. 10. Payout prediction by StraTap and ISP Log attacks, com-
pared to empirical payout, in mili Bitcoin (mBTC), as a function
of the miner’s frequency of operation (MHz). The actual payout
series (red diamonds) corresponds to daily payouts collected from
the F2Pool account records. The StraTap payout series (blue
disks) shows daily payout predictions based on entire Stratum
messages intercepted. The ISP Log series (green triangles) shows
the daily payout prediction when using the average inter-packet
times over 50 packets. StraTap’s prediction error ranges between
1.75-6.5% (MSE=0.062, MPE=3.46%). ISP Log has an error
between 0.53 - 34.4% (MSE = 2.02, MPE = -9.49%).
ear relationship between the frequency of operation and
the device’s hashrate achieved. As a consequence, this
relationship is preserved across the empirical payout re-
ported by the pool operators.
Specifically, we have used the pool’s hashrate to
BTC conversion (see § 2.4) to predict the miner’s result-
ing daily payout. Figure 10 shows the data series for the
empirical and predicted payouts, versus the operation
frequency of the miner. The StraTap attack achieves
a prediction error of between 1.75% and 6.5%, with a
mean square error (MSE) of 0.062 and mean percent-
age error (MPE) of -3.46%. Thus, StraTap’s predictions
tend to be slightly larger than the actual payout values.
9.2 The ISP Log Attack
We first present results of our analysis of F2Pool’s
hashrate inference protocol. We then show the ability
of the ISP Log attack to leverage these findings to infer
the miner’s daily payouts, given only metadata of the
miner’s packets.
Hashrate inference protocol. As mentioned in § 4.2,
immediately following the miner subscription and au-
thorization, the pool sets the difficulty to 1024, and
changes it only after receiving a sufficient number of
share submissions to infer the miner’s hashrate. For in-
stance, Figure 11(a) shows that when the miner operates
at 200MHz, the number of share submissions between
the first two share difficulty notification messages is sim-
(a)
(b)
Fig. 11. Timelines that focus on the interval between the first
two share difficulty notifications, following a miner subscrip-
tion and authorization protocol, when (a) the miner operates at
200MHz and (b) the miner operates at 600MHz. While the inter-
vals between the first two such notifications at both frequencies
contain approximately 50 share submission packets, this interval
is significantly shorter at 600MHz. This is because at 600MHz
the miner can solve the 1024 difficulty puzzles much faster than
at 200MHz. The “ISP Log” attack exploits this observation to
infer the hashrate of the miner, while only counting packets (i.e.,
without being able to inspect them).
ilar to the number of share submissions when the miner
operates at 600MHz (Figure 11(b)) (approximately 50).
However, the time interval between the first two share
difficulty notifications is much shorter at 600MHz: the
miner can compute 50 shares at the constant difficulty
1024 much faster than when operating at 200MHz.
More general, Table 2 shows the number of share
submission packets sent for this initial measurements
period for each of the frequencies analyzed. We observe
that the pool requires that this process generates at
least 50 share submissions, irrespective of the miner op-
eration frequency. The pool waits up to 288 seconds to
receive the required number of shares, before sending
the second share difficulty notification.
We conjecture that the pool uses this process in or-
der to infer the hashrate of the miner, which it needs in
order to assign jobs (puzzles) that a miner can solve at
a “desirable” rate. Specifically, large pools handle thou-
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Freq(MHz) # of Packets Time Interval
100 57 288.872897148
150 56 256.145660877
200 51 153.622557878
250 63 146.007184982
300 55 131.089562893
350 62 146.259056807
400 54 101.954112053
450 67 104.665092945
500 50 58.2229411602
550 62 76.0586118698
600 54 50.7432210445
650 56 45.6691811085
Table 2. Number of share submission packets for the initial 1024
difficulty period, as well as the length of the time interval when
the pool accepted those shares, for various miner frequencies of
operation. At any miner operation frequency, at least 50 share
submission packets are accepted, irrespective of wait time. This
process enables the pool and the ISP Log attack to infer the
miner’s hashrate.
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Fig. 12. 1st, 2nd and 3rd quartile for the inter-packet times of
the first 50 packets during the initial difficulty setting procedure,
as a function of the miner’s operating frequency. We observe a
monotonically decreasing tendency of the inter-packet times, with
an increase in the miner capabilities. This suggests that inter-
packet time stats over the first 50 packets can provide a good
hashrate estimator for the ISP Log attack.
sands of miners simultaneously 2. In order to minimize
the time it takes to process share submissions received
from thousands of miners, the pool needs to regulate the
rate at which a miner submits shares, irrespective of the
miner’s computing capabilities. Figure 5 illustrates this
share submission rate control. In our experiments we
observed that for F2Pool, this rate ranges to between
1 to 4 share submissions per minute. A second reason
for this process stems from the need of miners to prove
computation progress and gain regular payouts.
ISP Log attack results. We have implemented the
ISP Log attack using statistics of the inter-packet ar-
rival time of the first 50 packets sent by the miner to the
2 The Bitcoin network currently has around 100,000 miners [25,
26], of which at least 16% work with F2Pool [27].
(a)
(b)
Fig. 13. Greedy BiteCoin attack timelines for (a) adversary and
(b) victim miner. In a 5h interval, the attacker hijacked 342 job
assignments and 72 corresponding share submissions of the victim
miner. 23 shares (the green clumps marked with red arrows) were
accepted by the pool.
pool, after a detected 3-way miner subscription and au-
thorization protocol. Figure 12 shows the 1st, 2nd (me-
dian) and 3rd quartiles of the inter-packet times, for the
first 50 packets, when the miner operates at frequencies
ranging from 100 to 650 MHz. The linearly decreasing
behavior of the median, 1st and 3rd quartiles indicates
that statistics over the inter-packet times of the first 50
packets, may make a good predictor.
To confirm this, we have used the mean inter-packet
time over the first 50 packets to predict the miner’s
hashrate and then its payout. Figure 10 compares the
ISP Log attack daily payout prediction with that of
StraTap and with the empirical payout. The ISP Log
has an error that ranges between 0.53% and 34.4%, with
an MSE of 2.02 and MPE of -9.49% . Thus, ISP Log over
predicts the daily payouts, and, as expected, it exceeds
the error of the StraTap attack.
9.3 BiteCoin: Proof of Concept
We have experimented with the BiteCoin implementa-
tion described in § 8.2. Specifically, the attacker greedily
injected all the jobs assigned by the pool into the victim
communication stream during the attack time and with-
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Fig. 14. Overhead comparison of Bedrock and a complete en-
cryption approach, for miner and pool. Bedrock imposes a small
daily overhead on both the pool (12.03s to handle 16,000 miners)
and miner (0.002s). However, a solution that encrypts all Stratum
packets imposes a daily overhead of 1.36 hours on the pool.
out any modification. Our implementation injected a to-
tal of 342 job assignments in a time interval of 5 hours,
from hour 21:25 to 02:24. The attacker monitored the
share submissions from the victim, and hijacked shares
corresponding to the injected jobs.
Figure 13 shows the results of this attack. The ad-
versary, whose timeline is shown in Figure 13(a), hi-
jacked 72 share submissions from the victim miner. 23
shares (the green clumps marked with red arrows) were
accepted by the pool, i.e., as if they were mined by the
attacker and not by the victim. 49 shares were rejected.
Figure 13(b) shows the timeline of the attack from the
perspective of the victim miner.
The gaps are likely due to the script trying to get
some constant work in. Every disconnection and recon-
nection of the attacker will trigger a subscribe protocol
where the first job has the true flag set. This would ex-
plain why there are no hijacked shares between around
22:00 and 1:00 in the attacker timeline and also the gap
of any activity in the victim timeline. These constant
reconnects may have constantly blanked the job pool of
the victim until the attacker was able to maintain its
connection to submit the shares.
9.4 The Bedrock Evaluation
We measured Bedrock’s encryption times when using
AES-256 in CBC mode on the AntMiner S7 and on a
server with 40 cores Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 v2
@ 2.20GHz and 64 GB RAM. The AntMiner was able
to encrypt 1024-blocks at 32,231.09 Kb/sec while the
server was able to encrypt at 86,131.07 Kb/sec for the
same block size.
Based on the collected data, Stratum generates an
average of 31.63 set difficulty messages per day. Fig-
ure 14 shows that Bedrock imposes a 0.002s decryption
overhead per day on an AntMiner S7, while on a pool
using the above server to handle 16,000 miners, it im-
poses an encryption overhead of 12.03 seconds per day.
In contrast, a solution that encrypts each Stratum
packet imposes an overhead of 0.13 seconds per day on
the AntMiner, and an unacceptable 1.36 hours per day
on the pool server, to handle 16,000 miners.
9.4.1 TLS Overheads
We also compare Bedrock against Stratum protected
with TLS. We have used a replay of a 24 hour subset
of our Stratum traffic dataset (§ 8.1), sent over TLS
between a laptop used as miner (AntMiner does not
support TLS) and the server above, used as the pool.
Computation overheads. To measure the TLS com-
putation overheads, we have used Tcpdump [47] to cap-
ture the times when Stratum/TLS packets leave from
and arrive at the pool application, and also captured
the time when the packets are sent from/received by
the pool TLS socket. We have computed the total daily
pool side TLS overhead of sending and receiving Stra-
tum packets (job assignment, share submission, notifi-
cations, set difficulty change, etc). Figure 14 shows the
difference between this overhead and the same overhead
but when using bare TCP. It shows that the daily com-
putation overhead imposed by TLS on the pool, through
the traffic of 16,000 miners, is 1.01 hours. This amounts
to a computational overhead percentage of at least 4.3%.
Bandwidth overhead. In addition, we have mea-
sured the bandwidth overhead imposed by TLS. The
total miner-to-pool payload (single miner) for cleart-
ext Stratum/TCP traffic is 465,875 bytes and for Stra-
tum/TLS is 738,873 bytes. The total pool-to-miner pay-
load of Stratum/TCP is 3,852,795 bytes while for Stra-
tum/TLS is 4,062,956 bytes. Thus, TLS imposes a 58%
overhead on the miner-to-pool bandwidth, for a total of
4.05GB daily overhead on the pool from 16,000 miners.
This uplink overhead is significant, especially for miners
in countries with poor Internet connectivity.
TLS imposes a 5% overhead on the pool-to-miner
bandwidth, for a total of 3.13GB daily overhead on the
pool. The TLS overhead is much larger in miner-to-pool
communications, even though there are more pool-to-
miner packets. This is because the miner-to-pool share
submission packets are much smaller than the pool-to-
miner job assignments, thus the TLS overhead (125 to
160 bytes) becomes a significant factor for them. In con-
trast, the percentage bandwidth overhead for Bedrock
is only 0.04%.
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Conclusions. Bedrock is more efficient than blanket
encryption and TLS. While the pool could use more
equipment to handle encryption more efficiently, blan-
ket encryption and TLS do not address the hashrate
inference vulnerability. In addition, TLS imposes a sig-
nificant uplink bandwidth overhead on miners.
10 Related Work
Bitcoin mining attacks. Decker and Wattenhofer [49]
study Bitcoin’s use of a multi-hop broadcast to propa-
gate transactions and blocks through the network to
update the ledger replicas, then study how the net-
work can delay or prevent block propagation. Heilman
et al. [50] propose eclipse attacks on the Bitcoin net-
work, where an attacker leverages the reference client’s
policy for updating peers to monopolize all the connec-
tions of a victim node, by forcing it to accept only fraud-
ulent peers. The victim can then be exploited to attack
the mining and consensus systems of Bitcoin. Bissas et
al. [51] present and validate a novel mathematical model
of the blockchain mining process and use it to conduct
an economic evaluation of double-spend attacks, both
with and without a concurrent eclipse attack.
Courtois and Bahack [52] propose a practical block
withholding attack, in which dishonest miners seek to
obtain a higher reward than their relative contribution
to the network. They also provide an excellent back-
ground description of the motivation and functionality
of mining pools and the mining process.
Bitcoin anonymity. Significant work has focused on
breaking the anonymity of Bitcoin clients [1–4]. For
instance, Biryukov et al. [1] proposed a method to
deanonymize Bitcoin users, which allows to link user
pseudonyms to the IP ad- dresses where the transactions
are generated. Koshy et al. [2] use statistical metrics for
mappings of Bitcoin to IP addresses, and identify pairs
that may represent ownership relations.
Several solutions arose to address this problem.
Miers et al. [5] proposed ZeroCoin, that extends Bit-
coin with a cryptographic accumulator and zero knowl-
edge proofs to provide fully anonymous currency trans-
actions. Ben-Sasson et al. [6] introduced Zerocash, a de-
centralized anonymous payment solution that hides all
information linking the source and destination of trans-
actions. Bonneau et al. [7] proposed Mixcoin, a currency
mix with accountability assurances and randomized fee
based incentives.
Our work is orthogonal to previous work on Bitcoin
anonymity, as it identifies vulnerabilities in Stratum, the
communication protocol employed by cryptocurrency
mining solutions. As such, our concern is for the pri-
vacy and security of the miners, as they generate coins.
Our attacks are also more general, as they apply not
only to Bitcoin, but to a suite of other popular altcoin
solutions, e.g., [20–22] that build on Stratum.
Effects of broken crypto on Bitcoin. Giechaskiel
et al. [45] systematically analyze the effects of broken
cryptographic primitives on Bitcoin. They reveal a wide
range of possible effects that range from minor privacy
violations to a complete breakdown of the currency. Our
attacks do not need broken crypto to succeed. However,
we show that Bedrock, our secure Stratum extension is
resilient to broken crypto primitives.
11 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the lack of security
in Stratum, Bitcoin’s mining communication protocol,
makes miners vulnerable to a suite of passive and ac-
tive attacks, that expose their owners to hacking, coin
and equipment theft, loss of revenue, and prosecution.
We have implemented and shown that the attacks that
we introduced are efficient. Our attacks reveal that en-
cryption is not only undesirable, due to its significant
overheads, but also ineffective: an adversary can pre-
dict miner earnings even when given access to only the
timestamps of miner communications. We have devel-
oped Bedrock, a minimal and efficient Stratum exten-
sion that protects the privacy and security of mining
protocol participants. We have shown that Bedrock im-
poses an almost negligible computation overhead on the
mining participants and is resilient to active attacks
even if the used cryptographic tools are compromised.
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